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“What is it that seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has 
no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate terrorism.” 
  - Elie Wiesel (1986 Nobel Peace Prize laureate), cited in Jai (2001) 
“On the whole, there is little reason for optimism that [an] […] increase in educational 
attainment will lead to a meaningful reduction in […] terrorism.” 
  - Krueger and Maleckova (2003: 142) 
 
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, policymakers, intellectuals, and the 
general public largely agreed that education needed to be strengthened to work as an 
‘antidote’ to terrorism (cf. Jai 2001). This spoke to the idea that education is associated with 
less hatred and ignorance and fewer socioeconomic and political grievances, thus making 
terrorism less likely. 
While intuitive, this optimistic view on the terrorism-education nexus is, however, called into 
question by anecdotal and academic evidence, which tends to be more pessimistic about the 
relationship between education and terrorism. For instance, the highly influential paper by 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) finds that education does not matter to terrorism on a cross-
country level, while—on an individual level—many terrorists tend to be rather well educated. 
Other studies point at a similar relationship (e.g., Berrebi 2007; Shafiq and Sinno 2010; Ganor 
2011). 
Why is there disagreement over the impact of educational attainment on terrorist activity? We 
argue that there is a country-specific dimension to the terrorism-education nexus which has 
been disregarded in previous empirical efforts. What is more, we argue that these very 3 
 
country-specific factors determine whether education—and the type of education—reduces or 
fuels terrorism. When country-specific conditions are favorable (e.g., sound institutions, 
strong economic development), education helps to reduce terrorism. However, when country-
specific conditions are poor, education may fuel terrorism. In other words, those very ‘great 
expectations’ associated with the positive role of education in terrorism—e.g., induced by 
education-centered foreign aid (Azam and Thelen 2008, 2010)—may in fact turn into ‘hard 
times’ when country-specific conditions are unfavorable. 
We provide an in-depth assessment of the terrorism-education nexus using cross-sectional 
time-series data for 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2007. As a major innovation, we 
identify groups of countries that differ with respect to certain socioeconomic, political and 
demographic traits (e.g., economic growth, income, politico-institutional conditions) by 
means of a cluster analysis and then examine whether the dynamics of the nexus are 
conditional upon cluster-specific circumstances. We also add to the existing evidence by 
considering the relationship between education and domestic terrorism. Previous studies only 
consider the effect of education on transnational terrorism.
1 Domestic terrorism, however, 
accounts for the bulk of terrorist activity (e.g., Enders et al. 2011) and—as we will discuss 
below—is expected to have a closer relationship with education variables. Third, we use 
several education indicators to systematically cover different levels of education (e.g., 
primary school enrollment, university enrollment), unlike earlier studies that rely on one 
specific education proxy only. This ought to add to the robustness of our findings and 
simultaneously provides new insights as to whether specific forms of education matter more 
strongly in certain parts of the world. For instance, for demographic and economic reasons, 
                                                 
1 Domestic terrorism involves only one country, whereas transnational terrorism involves at 
least two countries (e.g., when domestic groups attack international targets).  4 
 
lower (i.e., primary) education may be more important for less developed countries, while 
developed countries may benefit more from higher (i.e., university) education. 
To preview our empirical findings, we find evidence of a ‘nontrivial’ effect of education on 
terrorism. Lower education levels tend to foster terrorism for a cluster of countries where poor 
conditions abound (e.g., slow growth, poor human and economic rights situation), while 
higher education levels tend to reduce terrorism for a cluster of countries where conditions are 
more favorable. These core findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Our findings 
call for a more nuanced analysis of the terrorism-education nexus, given that country-specific 
circumstances and the choice of adequate education proxies seem to matter to empirical 
inferences. Our results suggest that promoting education in less developed countries may 
actually foster terrorism when poor structural socioeconomic, politico-institutional and 
demographic issues (e.g., poor economic growth, poverty, inequality, repression, 
discrimination) are not addressed at the same time. Interestingly, our framework not only 
helps to better understand the role of education in terrorism. It also relates to other historic 
incidences of political violence such as the French Revolution of 1789 (e.g., Glaeser et al. 
2007) or the 2011 popular uprisings during the Arab Spring (e.g., Campante and Chor 2011), 
which were characterized by a combination of educational advances and poor institutional, 
socioeconomic and demographic circumstances. Such linkages have been largely ignored in 
the study of the role of education in terrorism. However, they may account for the 
inconclusive evidence on the terrorism-education nexus on cross-national level as well as the 
positive correlation between education and terrorism on the micro level. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the literature on the relationship 
between education and terrorism. Section 3 introduces the data and empirical methodology. 
Section 4 presents and discusses our main empirical findings. Section 5 offers several 
robustness checks and extensions to our empirical efforts. Section 6 concludes. 5 
 
2. The Terrorism-Education Nexus: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Great expectations: Why education should reduce terrorism 
Following the rational-choice approach, education is expected to determine the level of 
terrorist activity by influencing its (opportunity) costs and benefits. The optimistic view of the 
terrorism-education nexus suggests that education raises terrorism’s opportunity costs by 
fostering individual socioeconomic success and political participation. For instance, higher 
education means higher personal human capital endowment and thus income, so that educated 
individuals ought to have more to lose (higher opportunity costs) when they choose to resort 
to terrorism. On the aggregate (national) level, higher levels of education are found to be 
positively related to economic growth and a reduction in poverty and income inequality (e.g., 
Temple 1999; Glaeser et al. 2004; Cohen and Soto 2007). This may additionally affect the 
terrorists’ calculus by inducing higher opportunity and also higher recruitment costs, given 
that, e.g., the size of the pool of potential terrorist recruits ought to shrink with more favorable 
socioeconomic conditions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 2005). 
Besides socioeconomic success, education is found to positively correlate with political 
participation. For instance, Dee (2004) finds that voter participation and support for free 
speech increase with individual education. Similarly, Barro (1999) and Glaeser et al. (2007) 
argue that education is among the determinants of democracy. Consequently, the positive 
effect of education on political participation may result in higher terrorism opportunity costs 
(due to the recognition and use of nonviolent means to foster political change) and thus less 
terrorist activity. What is more, the favorable interaction between education, economic 
development and democracy may lead to positive politico-institutional outcomes, e.g., as 
corruption is reduced or redistribution takes place in a more welfare-enhancing way (e.g., in 
the form of public spending on education), which may further reinforce the positive effect of 
education on economic growth (e.g., Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993; Glaeser et al. 2007). 6 
 
Finally, education may also change personal attitudes towards extremist ideologies, the use of 
violence and its legitimization (Victoroff 2005). These effects may be reflected in lower 
(perceived) personal benefits from terrorism as well as higher recruitment costs for terrorist 
groups. For instance, educated individuals may evaluate the probability of terrorist success 
more realistically and therefore be less easy to recruit. Also, the educated may more easily see 
through the terrorists’ propaganda, so that terrorist mobilization is constrained and popular 
support remains marginal. The latter mechanism can be understood as a representation of the 
popular—perhaps somewhat idealistic—idea that education counters hate and ignorance, and 
implies higher moral constraints associated with the use of violence (cf. Victoroff 2005). 
In summary, the optimistic view of the terrorism-education nexus argues that education raises 
the (opportunity) costs and lowers the benefits of terrorism in such a way that the risk of 
terrorism is reduced. This leads to our first hypothesis (H1): 
Hypothesis 1: Countries with higher levels of education will (ceteris paribus) 
experience lower levels of terrorism. 
Some empirical studies on the causes of terrorism implicitly back this hypothesis. They find 
that terrorism is positively related to poor institutions such as a deficient rule of law (e.g., 
Choi 2010; Walsh and Piazza 2011), socioeconomic underdevelopment (e.g., Blomberg and 
Hess 2008; Freytag et al. 2011) and inefficient means of redistribution and economic 
participation (e.g., Burgoon 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks 2010, Piazza 2011). If education 
positively interacts with economic and political development, as the previous discussion 
suggests, then education ought to be negatively related to terrorism since it removes the 
economic and institutional grievances that usually fuel terrorism. Likewise, studies on the 
causes of other forms of political violence (e.g., protests, rebellions, civil war) suggest that 
interactions—which are similar to those discussed above—between education, 
underdevelopment and conflict also matter to these conflicts. For example, they consistently 7 
 
find that these conflicts are related to economic and political grievances (e.g., Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). What is more, the evidence suggests that education is 
negatively related to civil wars (e.g., Thyne 2006). If terrorism and other forms of conflict 
share similar roots—as suggested by, e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger (2011: 251)—then 
education may have a similar (dampening) effect on terrorism. 
 
2.2 Education during good and hard times: An alternative view 
Although the previous discussion provides some evidence that education may reduce 
terrorism, skeptical views prevail. While most cross-national and global (large-N) studies on 
the causes of terrorism do not consider the effect of education on terrorism, a review of those 
studies that control for the impact of education on terrorism fails to produce a consistent 
picture (Table 1). For example, while Bravo and Dias (2006) find that education makes 
terrorism less likely, Testas (2004) comes to the opposite conclusion. Even more puzzlingly, 
studies that analyze the relationship between individual education and participation in 
terrorism often find that the two are positively related (e.g., Victoroff 2005; Berrebi 2007; 
Benmelech and Berrebi 2007; Krueger 2008). For example, in their highly influential 
contribution Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find that terrorist operatives who are engaged in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict (e.g., the Jewish underground, Hezbollah) are on average well 
educated. 
-Table 1 here - 
Why may education positively correlate with terrorism? Building on the existing literature, we 
argue that education may fuel terrorism when country-specific conditions are unfavorable. 
Such poor conditions may consist of a set of socioeconomic (e.g., poor growth, economic 
disenfranchisement), politico-institutional (e.g., discrimination, corruption, poor governance) 
or demographic (e.g., population growth) factors. Due to poor country-specific circumstances, 8 
 
advances in education may not sufficiently increase the opportunity costs of terrorism because 
the relevant transmission channels (e.g., income, political participation, economic growth) do 
not work properly on individual and social levels, meaning that no nonviolent opportunities 
open up. For instance, slow economic growth and slack labor markets may cause individuals 
to take up jobs that do not match their qualification and thus their expected personal income. 
Also, institutional constraints (e.g., corruption, nepotism) may redirect the flow of educated 
labor into the public sector, consequently inhibiting economic growth by creating 
inefficiencies and constraining private economic activity (Pritchett 2001). Likewise, when 
political participation is constrained (e.g., due to poor democratic institutions), education 
cannot be easily linked to positive political development. 
Other mechanisms may even promote the genesis of terrorism. First, education may make it 
easier for individuals to recognize those poor social conditions (e.g., socioeconomic and 
politico-institutional constraints) that limit the personal and social success that is expected 
from education. For instance, Shafiq and Sinno (2010) argue that increases in education 
coupled with political disenfranchisement lead to greater support for (suicide) terrorism, 
potentially because education helps individuals to contextualize political problems and 
possibly choose violence as a means of achieving political change. Second, education may 
increase the (perceived) benefits from terrorism, given that an eventual removal of existing 
social constraints ought to benefit the educated the most. In case of terrorist success, 
education may finally pay off (e.g., in terms of income, growth and political participation), 
particularly for the highly educated. Third, when the labor market fails to offer individuals an 
adequate return on their investment in education, it may become increasingly attractive for 
individuals to pursue a ‘career’ in terrorism. Terrorist organizations may offer their operatives 
wages and other incentives (e.g., reputation as a terrorist leader, martyrdom) that are closer to 
individual human capital endowments and associated aspirations than those offered by the 9 
 
regular labor market (cf. Bueno de Mesquita 2005). Fourth, education may also lower the 
(perceived) costs of terrorism. Intuitively, education makes terrorist success (e.g., launching 
an attack, evading prosecution) likelier. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) argues that due to the 
positive effect of individual human capital endowment on terrorist success terrorist 
organizations are particularly interested in members with higher levels of education.
2  
To sum up, when poor country-specific conditions abound, education does not sufficiently 
translate into higher opportunity costs of terrorism. Instead, education may facilitate 
mobilization due to an increased attractiveness of terrorism for educated individuals, which 
reinforces the probability of terrorist success. This leads to the following hypothesis (H2a): 
Hypothesis 2a: Countries with higher levels of education will (ceteris paribus) 
experience higher levels of terrorism when country-specific (socioeconomic, 
political, institutional, demographic etc.) circumstances are poor. 
This hypothesis is supported by a number of examples. For instance, Abeyratne (2004) argues 
that in Sri Lanka increases in education in combination with poor country-specific conditions 
(strong population growth, youth burden, ethnic discrimination, socioeconomic and political 
volatility and exclusion) led to armed insurgencies by the communist Janathā Vimukthi 
Peramuna and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Similarly, Ganor (2011) 
argues that the expansion of education in Palestine in the 1970s was not met by adequate 
demand for highly-skilled labor, but instead led to increasing frustration, humiliation and 
radicalization among young Palestinians who eventually filled the ranks of radical groups 
active during the 1987 Intifada. Ganor (2011) also suggests that the interplay between 
                                                 
2 Note that the preponderance of poor social conditions and the lack of nonviolent alternatives 
also ought to increase the pool of potential recruits from which terrorist organizations usually 
choose the most educated members, meaning lower recruitment costs that may also facilitate 
terrorist activity (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). 10 
 
education, denied opportunities, alienation and frustration may contribute to the 
radicalization—and possibly, terrorist activity—among Muslim youth in Western European 
communities. The findings of Testas (2004), Kavanagh (2011), and Urdal (2006) also suggest 
that the reciprocity between advances in education and poor social conditions matters to the 
emergence of social conflicts. For instance, Urdal (2006) finds that an expansion in education 
that is coupled with demographic pressures makes civil conflict more likely. Finally, the 
recent revolutions and riots in Northern Africa and the Middle East—as well as other forms of 
political protest—can also be linked to the interaction between rising educational levels, 
which induce political activism, and socioeconomic underperformance (Campante and Chor 
2011).
3 
Following this line of reasoning, the role of education in terrorism may be determined by the 
change in educational attainment relative to the change in politico-institutional and socio-
demographic conditions. If the former dominates the latter at relatively low levels, terrorism 
becomes more likely. However, it seems reasonable to expect politico-institutional and socio-
demographic factors to eventually catch up with educational quality, which ought to reverse 
the outcomes. Hence, as a corollary of hypothesis H2a we argue that education can be 
expected to exert a dampening effect on terrorism when social conditions are more favorable. 
Education ought to contribute to (individual and social) progress when the socioeconomic, 
demographic and politico-institutional barriers that govern employment, economic 
redistribution, political participation, etc. are low or nonexistent. In turn, this is expected to 
make terrorism less likely by sufficiently raising its opportunity costs (as outlined above), 
where these effects ought to outweigh those through which education may fuel terrorism (e.g., 
the improved recognition of disenfranchisement). This leads to the final hypothesis (H2b): 
                                                 
3 See Glaeser et al. (2007) for further historic examples where increases in education 
contributed to political protest and revolutions. 11 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Countries with higher levels of education will (ceteris paribus) 
experience lower levels of terrorism when country-specific (socioeconomic, 
political, institutional, demographic etc.) circumstances are favorable. 
This does not, however, rule out the emergence of terrorism when favorable social conditions 
abound. In fact, the history of domestic terrorism in Western Europe and the US after the 
Second World War indicates that advances in education did not ‘immunize’ societies against 
terrorism. Rather, many terrorists from these countries had an academic background (e.g., 
Victoroff 2005).
4 However, domestic terrorist activity in Western countries was often 
perpetrated by isolated groups that failed to obtain popular support or achieve generational 
transition as they were not successful in recruiting younger followers (Cronin 2006). In 
accordance with our previous discussion, we may speculate that the beneficial interaction 
between advances in education and favorable country-specific conditions—besides other 
factors—minimized the pool of potential terrorists and supporters in these countries and 
raised terrorism opportunity costs, making it practically infeasible for a sustained terrorist 
campaign to enjoy broad popular support. 
 
                                                 
4 As argued by Bueno de Mesquita (2005), the high educational level of Western terrorists can 
be explained by the screening of potential recruits for (educational) quality by terrorist 
groups. 12 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We test which of the hypotheses discussed in the previous section are supported by the data 
for a panel of 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2007.
5 The summary statistics are reported 
in Table 2. A country list is given in the appendix. 
– Table 2 here – 
 
3.1 Dependent variable: Domestic terrorism 
Our dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents in a given year and 
country.
6 Previous studies have focused on the causes of transnational terrorism mainly due to 
data constraints (cf. Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). However, the relationship between 
education and domestic terrorism is unlikely to be identical to the interaction between 
education and transnational terrorism as different factors may matter. For instance, 
transnational terrorism seems to be more strongly motivated by international political factors 
(e.g., foreign policy) than domestic terrorism (Pape 2003; Dreher and Gassebner 2008; Savun 
and Phillips 2009). 
The economic mechanisms from education to reduced terrorist activity—via an amelioration 
of grievances (H1) or via the interaction between education and country-specific conditions 
that (potentially) determines the effect of education on terrorism (H2a and H2b)—are 
intuitively expected to matter more strongly to the genesis of domestic terrorism. The fact that 
domestic terrorism is far more common than transnational terrorism (e.g., Enders et al. 2011) 
                                                 
5 Our panel is unbalanced, given that some countries in the sample achieved independence 
only after 1991. 
6 As a robustness check we also consider alternative measures of terrorist activity (cf. Section 
5). 13 
 
further motivates our decision to study the effect of education on domestic terrorism. Finally, 
there is a lack of evidence on the causes of domestic terrorism in general (Krieger and 
Meierrieks 2011), and with respect to the role of education in domestic terrorism (cf. Table 1). 
The data for our dependent variable are drawn from Enders et al. (2011), who use raw 
terrorism data provided by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). While the GTD contains 
data on domestic and transnational terrorism, it does not differentiate between the two. Enders 
et al. (2011) decompose the data series into domestic and transnational terrorist events. They 
also deal with some methodological problems (e.g., coding issues) in the GTD series. As a 
result, the domestic terrorism data provided by Enders et al. (2011) are to date the most 
reliable count data measuring this kind of activity.
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3.2 Education variables 
As argued above, the large-N studies that analyze the determinants of terrorism and 
incorporate measures of education (cf. Table 1) may have failed to unveil a consistent 
relationship between the two for theoretical reasons (i.e., the failure to consider the 
moderating effect of country-specific conditions on the terrorism-education nexus). In 
addition, different analytical scopes (country samples, observation periods, education 
indicators etc.) may have contributed to empirical inconsistencies. In this study we use a 
uniform country sample to assess the influence of various education variables on the 
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, we experiment with different approaches towards dealing with 
remaining data problems that are discussed by Enders et al. (2011). For instance, they argue 
that the GTD tends to overreport terrorism for some time periods, which should be accounted 
for by adjusting the data accordingly. However, this leads to findings similar to those obtained 
using the unadjusted data (results available upon request). 14 
 
emergence of domestic terrorism. By doing so, we ought to examine, amongst others, whether 
the choice of a specific education proxy matters to statistical inferences. 
We measure education by primary school enrollment per capita (primary education), 
secondary school enrollment per capita ( secondary education), the sum of primary and 
secondary school enrollment, university enrollment per capita (university enrollment) and the 
literacy rate (i.e., the number of people aged 15 and over who are able to read or write over 
the total population).
8 All education data are drawn from the Cross-National Time-Series 
Data Archive. 
These measures ought to reflect the size and quality of a country’s human capital stock. That 
is, higher enrollment and literacy rates are expected to correspond to higher levels of 
education, where education may either reduce terrorism uniformly (H1) or affect terrorism 
depending on country-specific circumstances (H2a and H2b). Our education measures may 
also reflect public investment in education and the effectiveness of educational institutions 
(e.g., Thyne 2006). For instance, higher enrollment rates ought to mean more investment in 
education (teachers, school buildings etc.) and stronger institutions related to education (e.g., 
child labor laws, compulsory education). A stronger public commitment to education ought to 
result in higher levels of education, which in turn matter to terrorism. Finally, our education 
variables also reflect the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ side of education. The ‘supply’ side of 
education relates to a country’s demographic structure (i.e., population structure, growth and 
                                                 
8 We also experimented with alternative measures of education as used by Thyne (2006). He 
employs data on primary, secondary and postsecondary enrollment and on literacy and 
government education spending, drawing on data from the World Development Indicators. 
While the results are not directly comparable due to data limitations (only the period 1994 to 
2007 is available), the findings tend to support the results of our main analysis (results 
available upon request). 15 
 
distribution). For instance, primary and secondary school enrollment may be more important 
to ‘young’ societies (less developed countries), while tertiary education matters more to 
‘older’ societies (developed countries). The ‘demand’ side of education relates to, e.g., the 
global division of labor, national economic structures and labor markets demands. For 
example, primary and secondary education may be more important in countries that do not 
rely on human-capital-intensive production (less developed countries), whereas in other 
countries tertiary education may more prominently determine personal and social success due 
to corresponding production and employment demands (developed countries). 
In short, we have good reason to believe that our education proxies correlate with education 
‘inputs’ (public investment, quality of educational institutions) and ‘outputs’ (size and quality 
of an economy’s human capital stock). Our explanatory variables are expected to indicate 
whether education truly matters to terrorism via the transmission channels discussed in 
Section 2. However, we can also expect that specific education variables matter more strongly 
to specific country groups, depending on factors such as state capacity, demographic structure 
and economic demands. For these reasons, we expect primary education to be the most 
adequate proxy of education in the less developed world, whereas tertiary education is 
expected to be most important in developed economies (cf. Barro and Lee 2010). 
 
3.3 Controls 
We include a number of controls to avoid detecting only spurious correlations between 
education and terrorism. We control for the effect of variables that determine education and 
terrorism at the same time (to ensure that the ceteris paribus condition of our hypotheses 
holds) or which need to be included for obvious statistical reasons. Wherever possible, we 
exclude variables that reflect a potential transmission channel from education to terrorism, so 
as to better isolate and identify the aggregate impact of education on terrorism. For instance, 16 
 
we do not control for economic growth, given that we expect education to influence terrorist 
activity—amongst other effects—via its beneficial impact on economic activity.
9 Additional 
information on all control variables (e.g., operationalization, measurement, data sources) is 
given in the appendix. 
First, we consider the effect of population size. Larger populations may signal higher 
demographic stress that fuels conflict. Alternatively, the positive correlation between 
population size and terrorism may simply stem from the fact that more populous countries 
provide more targets, victims and terrorists. In any case, population size is consistently found 
to be a strong, positive predictor of terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Gassebner and 
Luechinger 2011). At the same time, larger populations lead to increased demand for 
investment in education and may affect enrollment (e.g., Busemeyer 2007). 
Second, we control for the effect of per capita military spending on terrorism. Gassebner and 
Luechinger (2011) argue that military spending constrains the opportunities for open rebellion 
and therefore leads to terrorism (as an alternative form of insurgency). On the other hand, 
higher military spending may reflect a higher state capacity for hampering or even 
suppressing all forms of rebellion, meaning that a negative effect of military expenditures on 
terrorism also seems possible. Simultaneously, budget decisions in favor of more military 
                                                 
9 Other potential determinants of terrorism that we do not include for this reason are, e.g., per 
capita income, the rule of law, measures of poverty and inequality, and the economic and 
human rights situation in a country. However, we control for these intervening variables in 
additional model specifications as part of our robustness analysis. As expected, their inclusion 
tends to reduce the overall effect of education on terrorism. Yet the general results of this 
study are robust to the inclusion of these variables (results available upon request). Also, note 
that we use several of these variables as conditioning variables when we create country 
groups by means of a cluster analysis (cf. Section 4). 17 
 
spending may imply comparatively lower public spending on education and thus a lower level 
of education (e.g., Krieger and Meierrieks 2012). 
Third, we control for the influence of various forms of political instability. Specifically, we 
account for the impact of general  strikes,  state failure and religious tensions. Political 
instability is expected to positively correlate with terrorism, given that instability, e.g., could 
exacerbate existing grievances and provide terrorists with opportunities to network, recruit 
and train, while undermining the ability of governments to counter terrorism effectively (e.g., 
Piazza 2008; Gassebner and Luechinger 2011). At the same time, these forms of instability 
may also affect education. 
It is also necessary to control for the effect of democracy. Given that education may impact 
terrorism through its effect on political openness, the inclusion of a regime type variable may 
mask the effect of education on terrorism. However, as found by Drakos and Gofas (2006a), 
democracies are systematically more likely to report terrorism (given that the press is less 
restricted) than autocratic regimes. The existence of an underreporting bias in terrorism 
therefore calls for the inclusion of a control that reflects this bias.
10 What is more, we also 
expect an effect of democracy on the patterns of education, given that democratic institutions 
usually positively correlate with public education efforts (e.g., Stasavage 2005; Burgoon 
2006). 
We furthermore consider the effect of trade openness. As argued by Mirza and Verdier 
(2008), there are a number of channels through which economic integration may affect 
terrorism. For instance, integration may facilitate economic disruption through terrorism (e.g., 
as supply chains are more vulnerable) or increase media attention. While such effects make 
                                                 
10 We try to minimize the influence of this variable by using a very rough measure of 
democracy (see appendix). As discussed below, we also run zero-inflated negative binomial 
models as a statistical method for dealing with the existence of an underreporting bias. 18 
 
terrorism more likely by increasing its benefits, alternatively openness may reduce terrorist 
activity when it predominantly produces economic gains that make violence comparatively 
less attractive (Mirza and Verdier 2008). At the same time, economic integration is also 
expected to affect education. For instance, trade may carry risks against which the 
government needs to provide insurance (e.g., by boosting social security spending), which 
may come at the expense of public education policies and efforts, thereby negatively affecting 
education (e.g., Burgoon 2006). 
Finally, we control for the effect of external conflict (i.e., international tensions and wars) on 
terrorism as a source of external instability. On the one hand, external conflict may make 
terrorism more likely by tying resources to this conflict, consequently reducing the capacity of 
a state to control its territory and effectively counter internal problems (Lai 2007). On the 
other hand, this very tying of government resources can also be expected to compromise 
education, potentially leading to lower educational outcomes. 
 
3.4 Empirical methodology 
The dependent variable of our empirical model is a count variable (the number of domestic 
terrorist attacks) which only covers discrete and nonnegative values. Its variance is also larger 
than its mean (cf. Table 2). Therefore, we employ a negative binomial model for (pooled) 
count data. This model is the standard econometric method used in the study of the 
determinants of terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Gassebner and Luechinger 2011).  
For all model specifications we let the independent (education) and control variables enter the 
model with (t-1) lagged values. This reflects the idea that any changes in these parameters 
should affect terrorism only after some time. Simultaneously, we avoid potential reverse 
causation and endogeneity problems, given that lagging all explanatory variables ought to 
reduce the correlation between these variables and the error term (e.g., Lai 2007). We include 19 
 
year dummies in all specifications to factor in time and trending effects (e.g., Burgoon 2006). 
Regional dummies (for the West, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America) 
are included to account for effects that matter to certain parts of the world. For all estimations 
we rely on standard errors that are clustered over cross-sections to account for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, given that previous tests have indicated their 
presence and potential influence on statistical inferences. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Full sample findings 
Our estimation results for the complete sample of 133 countries are reported in Table 3. The 
findings reject H1. We do not find that higher levels of education coincide with a reduction in 
domestic terrorism. Rather, the findings suggest that education tends to positively correlate 
with terrorist activity. In particular, there is a statistically significant association between 
lower levels of education (literacy rates, primary education) and domestic terrorism, while 
there is no correlation with higher education (university enrollment). These findings are more 
in line with H2a and the empirical mainstream. 
- Table 3 here - 
Table 3 also indicates that other factors influence terrorism. As expected, more populous 
countries are more prone to domestic terrorism. Internal political instability (strikes, incidents 
of state failure and religious tensions) and external threats (international conflict) make 
domestic terrorism more likely. Again, these findings mirror the empirical mainstream and 
suggest that instability lowers the operating costs of terrorism (e.g., by diverting government 
resources to other threats and creating political vacuums) and its opportunity costs by 
constraining nonviolent activities (e.g., Lai 2007; Piazza 2008). Also, we find that 20 
 
democracies are more prone to domestic terrorism. As argued before, this positive correlation 
may indicate the presence of an underreporting bias. Finally, trade openness and military 
spending do not robustly influence terrorist activity. 
 
4.2 Cluster analysis 
The purpose of this subsection is to create groups of countries that differ with respect to 
certain socioeconomic, political and demographic variables. By differentiating between 
countries with ‘good’ (favorable) and ‘bad’ (unfavorable) conditions we expect to better 
assess the validity of our hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
We employ a cluster analysis to identify natural groupings within our dataset that would 
otherwise not be apparent. For the cluster analysis we collect data on socioeconomic 
development and performance (GDP per capita, inflation, economic growth), politico-
institutional variables (rule of law, corruption, government size, human rights situation, 
economic freedom, female labor participation) and demographic factors (population density, 
population growth, urbanization). We then average each variable over the respective available 
observation period and run a two-step cluster analysis (e.g., Chiu et al. 2001). One advantage 
of this procedure is that it automatically chooses the optimal number of clusters. The results 
of the cluster analysis are reported in Table 4. 
- Table 4 here - 
Our analysis identifies two clusters. In comparison to Cluster 2, Cluster 1 exhibits ‘poorer’ 
conditions with a weaker rule of law, poorer protection of human and property rights, slower 
economic growth, and lower per capita income, female labor participation, urbanization and 
population density, but higher levels of corruption, population growth, inflation, and larger 21 
 
governments.
11 According to the exact breakdown of the sample (cf. the country list in the 
appendix), Cluster 2 includes all OECD economies, some rich oil economies and some 
emerging markets (‘developed countries’ cluster), while Cluster 1 includes all Sub-Saharan 
African countries and most countries in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East (‘less 
developed countries’ cluster). 
For the less developed countries we anticipate to find evidence in support of H2a. Here, 
increases in education are not expected to pay off because socioeconomic (e.g., high inflation, 
slow economic growth), politico-institutional (e.g., high levels of corruption and repression) 
and demographic (e.g., high population growth) conditions are unfavorable. Instead, 
education may fuel domestic terrorism, as outlined above. Given the demographic and 
economic structures in the less developed world, this relationship ought to be more 
pronounced for variables reflecting lower education. By contrast, for the developed countries 
we expect to find evidence supporting H2b. Education ought to reduce terrorism by 
interacting favorably with good country-specific conditions. Variables indicating higher 
education ought to matter most to this relationship. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Other potential conditioning variables are not included due to a lack of data. For instance, 
we are not able to include data on youth burdens. However, we are confident that the two 
country groups are also similarly different with respect to these omitted variables. For 
instance, Cluster 1 ought to experience much stronger demographic pressure from youth 
burdens than Cluster 2. Note that we also experimented with other cluster specifications (e.g., 
by dropping certain variables used for the cluster identification) and re-ran our estimations. 
Here, our results were usually in line with those reported in the main text (results available 
upon request). 22 
 
4.3 Results for a subsample of less developed countries 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for a subsample of less developed countries (Cluster 1). 
In short, the findings with respect to the effect of education on domestic terrorism strongly 
mirror those reported for the full sample (cf. Table 3). That is, we find that variables reflecting 
lower education (primary education, literacy rate) are positively associated with terrorism, 
while higher education (university enrollment) does not play a role. 
- Table 5 here - 
These findings support hypothesis H2a. Conditional upon the presence of poor country-
specific conditions, education makes terrorism more likely. Presumably, education does not 
increase terrorism’s opportunity costs. The beneficial individual and social effects of 
education (e.g., socioeconomic success, political participation, institutional improvements) do 
not seem to materialize due to the structural socioeconomic, political and demographic 
constraints that are endemic in these countries (cf. Table 4). Rather, education is positively 
correlated with terrorism because it may, e.g., facilitate mobilization because terrorism 
appears more attractive to educated individuals. In turn, this relationship reinforces the 
probability of terrorist success. Note that the findings with respect to controls are in line with 
those reported in Table 3. 
 
4.4 Results for a subsample of developed countries 
We analyze the effect of education on domestic terrorism for the smaller sample of developed 
economies (Cluster 2). The findings are reported in Table 6. 
- Table 6 here - 
In contrast to the findings for the complete country sample (cf. Table 3) and the subsample of 
less developed countries (cf. Table 5), the results for the subsample of developed countries 23 
 
reveal a different relationship between education and domestic terrorism. There is no positive 
association between lower education and terrorism. Instead, we find a negative and 
statistically significant effect of higher education (university enrollment) on domestic 
terrorism, which supports H2b. That is, in a favorable environment—characterized by, e.g., 
sufficient means of socioeconomic and political participation—education seems to exert a 
dampening influence on terrorism. On the one hand, there is good reason to believe that 
education can markedly improve personal and social living conditions (e.g., higher incomes, 
stronger economic growth, poverty reduction, democratization, institutional advances) when 
the barriers for socioeconomic and political participation are rather low. This ought to mean 
higher opportunity costs for terrorism and thus less terrorism. On the other hand, the 
availability of nonviolent opportunities and the lack of (apparent) disenfranchisement ought to 
undermine efforts by terrorist groups to mobilize and rally popular support. This is equivalent 
to higher operating costs of terrorist organizations which ought to generate less terrorism. 
As argued before, this does not mean that the beneficial interaction between education and 
politico-economic development ‘immunizes’ against the terrorist threat. There may still be 
reasons to rebel. However, terrorist movements in the developed world have rarely become 
mass movements; rather, they have remained isolated groups within society. One contributing 
factor seems to be the appeasing effect of (advances in higher) education. 
The findings with respect to controls mirror the previous ones with two exceptions. First, we 
find a weakly significant, negative effect of military spending on terrorism. Higher spending 
may indicate increased security and counterterrorism efforts that raise the operating costs of 
terrorism, thus making it less likely (e.g., Lai 2007).
12 Second, we also find that democracies 
                                                 
12 The marginally positive effect of military spending on terrorism in Tables 3 and 5 can be 
interpreted as in Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), who argue that a positive correlation 
between spending and terrorism reflects the asymmetric nature of terrorist conflicts. 24 
 
are less likely to see terrorism. While this may be a mere consequence of our country sample 
and model specification—as suggested by Gassebner and Luechinger (2011)—it may also 
indicate that political participation, in particular when coupled with a sound institutional 
framework and relatively high levels of education, makes terrorism less likely by offering 
nonviolent means of voicing dissent and achieving political change. 
 
5. Robustness and Extensions 
This section scrutinizes the robustness of the findings presented in the previous section and 
discusses some extensions to these efforts. We discuss our findings only briefly. The 
corresponding tables are reported in the supplementary material. 
 
5.1 Reverse causality and endogeneity 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence of a causal relationship between 
an increase in terrorism and a reduction in education. Also, the socioeconomic consequences 
of terrorism tend to be small and short-lived, suggesting no strong adverse impact of terrorism 
on factors such as education (cf. Tavares 2004). However, it seems possible that terrorism 
impairs education by, e.g., diverting resources away from public spending on education and 
damaging the educational infrastructure, given that the civil war literature similarly suggests 
that conflict may compromise education (Thyne 2006). Furthermore, Dreher et al. (2011) find 
that terrorist activity causes emigration of the most talented due to the high opportunity costs 
of losing their human capital investment. Arguably, in terrorized economies there may be a 
lower demand for education for the same reasons. 
We therefore run a series of regressions of various education measures on past terrorist 
activity to examine whether reverse causation is present, and also control for a number of 25 
 
covariates (e.g., instability, population size, regional and time dummies). While preliminary, 
we find no evidence of a systematic effect of terrorism on education, implying that reverse 
causation is not a problem. Also, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests do not indicate that education 
is endogenous to terrorism. Finally, as in Azam and Thelen (2010), we control for 
endogeneity using a two-step Hausman test. In the first stage of this test, we regress our 
respective education variables on a set of exogenous controls (e.g., external conflict, 
democracy, economic and institutional development) and store the resulting residuals from 
these regressions. In the second test stage, the residuals are included in the respective count 
data models outlined above. Here, any significant residual indicates that endogeneity is 
present and biases our estimates. However, for various model specifications (Tables 3, 5 and 
6) this is not the case. That is, this method, too, indicates that education is not endogenous to 
terrorism. 
 
5.2 Alternative dependent variables 
Arguably, education and domestic terrorism ought to share the closest relationship. However, 
the strict coding rules of Enders et al. (2011) may lead to the omission of important 
information on terrorism (e.g., when a domestic group attacks international targets or when a 
domestic group does not claim responsibility for an attack). Thus, it seems reasonable to 
employ alternative measures of terrorist activity to examine the robustness of our findings. 
Thus, we also analyze the relationship between education and total terrorist activity. Here, 
transnational terrorist incidents together with domestic terrorism and attacks by unknown 
perpetrators sum up for total terrorist activity, with data drawn from the GTD. 
We run a series of estimations using the same empirical setup as described before. In 
summary, we find that our previously reported results hold when we focus on total instead of 
domestic terrorism. In particular, while lower education increases the likelihood of total 26 
 
terrorism in the less developed world, higher education correlates negatively with these 
indicators in developed economies. This supports our hypotheses H2a and H2b that education 
interacts beneficially (detrimentally) with a favorable (unfavorable) environment. The fact 
that the results for the controls are very much in line with our previously reported findings in 
Tables 3, 5 and 6 adds to the value of our findings.
13 
 
5.3 Alternative estimation techniques 
Next, we consider whether our findings are robust to alternative estimation methods. First, we 
run a series of zero-inflated negative binomial regressions, which is a method that accounts 
for the previously discussed reporting bias in terrorism. Drakos and Gofas (2006b) argue that 
autocracies tend to systematically underreport terrorism, so that the occurrence of excessive 
zeros is determined by a country’s regime type. The zero-inflated estimations are modeled 
accordingly, where the control variable democracy is chosen as the variable governing the 
zero-always outcome which may result from an underreporting bias. Second, we estimate a 
series of population-averaged negative binomial models for panel data (or generalized 
estimation equation models). This statistical approach allows us to fully consider the panel 
structure of our dataset, while controlling for heterogeneity and autocorrelation by means of 
                                                 
13 We also experiment with a different definition of domestic terrorism, where we code an 
attack as domestic when the attacking terrorist group is located in the country of the attack. 
The findings for this coding effort mirror those reported above. We also use the number of 
transnational terrorist incidents as an alternative dependent variable, employing the data 
provided by Enders et al. (2011). Here, our findings are once again in line with those reported 
in the main text (results available upon request). 27 
 
panel-corrected standard errors and an AR(1) term.
14 Amongst others, Choi (2010) uses this 
empirical approach. In short, our results indicate that the zero-inflated estimation results 
closely mirror those presented beforehand. The findings from the population-averaged model 
also tend to support the findings of this study. 
 
5.4 Long-run effects of education on terrorism 
Education changes slowly and therefore potentially needs some time to generate positive 
outcomes that in turn ‘morph’ into higher terrorism (opportunity) costs and less terrorist 
activity. Therefore, we take 6-year averages of our dependent, education and control variables 
and then regress terrorism on contemporary values of the controls (i.e., averages of the same 
period) and on past values of the education proxy (i.e., averages of the previous period). This 
ought to reflect a long-run causal effect of education on terrorism. Remarkably, we find that 
previous innovations in primary education positively sway terrorist activity for the full sample 
and for the subsample of less developed economies. We also find that past changes in 
university enrollment negatively correlate with present levels of terrorism in the developed 
world. That is, there indeed seems to be a causal effect of education on terrorism that depends 
on country-specific circumstances and emerges through the influence of education on the 
cost-benefit matrices of (potential) terrorists. 
 
5.5 Education expansion and terrorism 
Next, we consider the effect of changes in education on terrorism, given that some studies 
analyze the effect of changes in education (instead of level data) on socioeconomic and 
                                                 
14 Note, however, that the unbalanced nature of our dataset may affect our findings.  28 
 
political variables (e.g., Temple 1999). An expansion in education may reflect, e.g., an 
increasing inflow of resources into the education system (e.g., public investment) and growth 
in a country’s human capital, but also increasing demographic, economic and political 
pressures when the growth in education is not accompanied—due to poor structural 
conditions and related constraints—by sufficient means of socioeconomic and political 
participation. 
In short, we find that an expansion in education tends to positively correlate with the 
emergence of terrorism in less developed countries, while it tends to reduce domestic 
terrorism in the developed world. Once more, these findings support our hypotheses H2a and 
H2b. 
 
5.6 Transmission channels 
Finally, we attempt to identify the transmission channels through which education influences 
terrorism. Here, auxiliary regressions indicate that, as argued above, education positively 
correlates with economic growth, higher income levels, more political openness and a better 
human and economic rights situation. As one would expect, these correlations are more robust 
for the subsample of developed economies. While these findings come from ad hoc 
estimations and surely need further scrutiny, they are nevertheless in line with previous 
theoretical and empirical findings (cf. Section 2) and suggest that respective transmission 
channels from education to terrorism are indeed present. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a reassessment of the terrorism-education nexus. Our study is motivated 
by conflicting hypotheses that relate a country’s level of education to its level of terrorist 29 
 
activity. The optimistic—perhaps somewhat euro-americentric—view argues that education 
makes terrorism less likely by inducing socioeconomic and political progress, thereby raising 
terrorism’s opportunity costs. From this perspective education also reduces the risk of 
terrorism by raising its (perceived) costs and lowering its (perceived) benefits as, e.g., the 
well-educated are expected to be ‘immune’ to terrorist propaganda, to disapprove of hate, 
ignorance and the use of violence, and to be more realistic about the probability of terrorist 
success. In contrast to this, more skeptical and sometimes pessimistic voices argue that 
education tends to work in the opposite direction. 
We propose a more nuanced perspective that takes both views into consideration. We argue 
that the true impact of education on terrorism is conditional upon socioeconomic, politico-
institutional and demographic circumstances. When these circumstances are unfavorable, 
education may incite terrorism because advances in education do not sufficiently translate into 
higher opportunity costs of terrorism. Instead, education may amplify feelings of frustration, 
humiliation and disenfranchisement (as argued by the proponents of the pessimistic view). 
What is more, education may increase the attractiveness of terrorism as an ‘occupation’, given 
that it may pay wages and offer career paths that match one’s expectations more closely than 
regular employment. Finally, education may increase the perceived benefits of terrorism (e.g., 
psychological and material rewards from eventual terrorist success), while lowering its 
perceived costs and increasing the probability of terrorist success (i.e., the ‘productivity’ of 
terrorism), which turns the educated into the preferred recruits for terrorist groups. Education 
can only be expected to have a beneficial (terrorism-reducing) effect when country-specific 
conditions are favorable. 
We analyze the validity of the hypotheses on the terrorism-education nexus using data for 133 
countries between 1984 and 2007. We find no evidence that education reduces terrorism 
across the board. Rather, we find that education at lower levels (primary education) leads to 30 
 
more terrorism for a cluster of countries where poor conditions abound (e.g., slow growth, 
poor human and economic rights situation), while high-level education (university education) 
reduces domestic terrorism for a cluster of countries where conditions are more favorable. 
These core findings are robust to a variety of methodological changes and robustness checks. 
They also match recent and historic events where educational advances promoted instability 
due to poor structural conditions such as the French Revolution of 1789, as argued by Glaeser 
et al. (2007), the Middle Eastern experience with terrorism on which Krueger and Maleckova 
(2003) build their argument, and the recent series of revolutions and popular uprisings during 
the Arab Spring (Campante and Chor 2011). 
What are the implications of this study? From a research perspective, we believe that scholars 
should more thoroughly take into account the potentially heterogeneous (i.e., country-
specific) relationship between education and terrorism, accounting for conditional and 
interacting effects and testing their hypotheses using various education proxies, given that the 
careful identification of the terrorism-education nexus seems to crucially depend on these 
factors. Future research may benefit from the eventual advent of more consistent education 
data that may help to better understand the role of education content, quality and public 
spending in the terrorism-education nexus.
15 Although we already touch on these issues, 
future research may also more thoroughly consider the exact mechanisms that influence the 
interaction between education, development and terrorism and that correlate with country-
specific conditions. Finally, future research may investigate the role of education in religious 
(Islamic) terrorism. For instance, education seems to play a major role in the very recent 
terrorist insurgency by the group Boko Haram (which roughly translates as Western or non-
                                                 
15 Also, future empirical studies may benefit from a further reduction in the measurement 
errors that can plague cross-national education data (e.g., Cohen and Soto 2007). 31 
 
Islamic education is a sin) in Nigeria, where terrorist activity seems to have emerged partly as 
a response to Western influence making itself felt through education. 
From a policy perspective, our findings indicate that advances in education produce great 
expectations and may result in hard times when those expectations are not met. That is, a sole 
strengthening of education in less developed countries—e.g., through foreign aid (Azam and 
Thelen 2008, 2010)—may not help in the war on terror. Rather, in line with broad strategies 
of ‘state-building’, the promotion of education should be accompanied by domestic and 
international efforts to ameliorate poor structural socioeconomic, politico-institutional and 
demographic conditions (poor economic growth, poverty, inequality, repression, 
discrimination, corruption, deficient legal institutions etc.). 
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Table 1: Large-N Studies Controlling for the Effect of Education on Terrorism 
Study Scope  Terrorism  Variable  Education Proxy  Effect on Terrorism 
















Bravo and Dias (2006)  60-85 countries 
1997-2004
† 
domestic and transnational 
terrorism (location) 
literacy rate of adult 
population 
(-)/significant 




secondary school enrollment 
index 
(+)/not significant 







illiteracy rate  (-)/not significant 






(location and origin) 
UNDP education index  largely (+)/not significant 




illiteracy of adult males  (-)/significant 





university enrollment  (+)/significant 
Urdal (2006)  99-158 countries  domestic and transnational  tertiary education growth (+)/significant 
 1984-1995  terrorism  (location)  interacted with youth burden   
Note: (
†) indicates that the study is a pure cross-sectional analysis. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics [Full Sample] 
Variable N*T  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Domestic Terrorist 
Attacks 
3082 11.049  42.103  0  673 
Total Terrorist 
Attacks 
3076 18.737  64.190  0  1041 
Primary 
Enrollment 
3053 12.146  4.943  2.94  35.71 
Secondary 
Enrollment 
3053 6.667  3.255  0.33  16.6 
Prim. + Sec. 
Enrollment 
3053 18.81  5.281  3.63  38.91 
University 
Enrollment 
3078 0.620  1.705  0  20.454 
Literacy Rate  3045  77.840  23.307  8.4  99.9 
Population  Size  3192  9.239 1.563 5.437 14.086 
Military  Spending  2973  4.087 1.680 0.032 9.923 
Strikes 3070  0.159  0.570  0 7 
State Failure  3078  0.604  1.649  0  13.5 
Religious Tensions  2967  0.244  0.228  0  1 
Democracy 3041  6.442 3.536 0  10 
Trade Openness  3072  73.593  47.777  1.035  441.224 













Table 3: Education and Domestic Terrorism Activity [Full Sample] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary Education t-1  0.063      0.065 
 (2.85)
***      (2.94)
*** 
Secondary Education t-1   0.026     0.030 
   (0.72)     (0.83) 
Prim. + Sec. Education t-1    0.052     
     (2.95)
***      
University Enrollment t-1     -0.812   -0.085 
     (1.34)   (1.08) 
Literacy Rate t-1      0.016   
      (2.55)
**  








Military Spending p.c. t-1  0.164 0.113 0.127 0.160 0.007 0.176 
 (1.82)
*  (1.19) (1.44) (1.75)
* (0.07)  (1.75)
* 
































Trade Openness t-1  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.03 
 (0.96)  (0.96)  (1.06)  (0.81) (1.01) (0.96) 








Log Pseudolikelihood  -5463.60 -5477.71 -5464.66 -5496.28 -5472.10  -5459.24
N*T  2692 2692 2692 2702 2686 2692 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents. Robust absolute z-
values clustered on countries reported in parentheses. Constant not reported. All models 
include time and regional dummies (not reported). (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 40 
 
Table 4: Cluster Analysis 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Law and Order  -0.579  0.668  0.993  0.620 
Corruption 0.507  0.579  -0.869  0.974 
Government Size  0.050  1.164  -0.085  0.628 
Physical  Integrity  -0.544  0.773 0.932 0.558 
Population  Density -0.127  0.217 0.218 1.610 
Population Growth  0.288  0.826  -0.493  1.085 
Urbanization  -0.474  0.876 0.813 0.596 
GDP per capita  -0.586  0.277  1.005  0.992 
Economic  Growth  -0.229  1.115 0.393 0.593 
Property Rights Protection   -0.588  0.714  1.008  0.475 
Inflation 0.160  1.229  -0.275  0.134 
Female Labor Participation  -0.038  0.985  0.064  1.033 
Cluster Distribution  N=84 (63.2%)  N=49 (36.8%) 
Notes: Results of the two-step cluster analysis. Optimal number of clusters automatically 
chosen based on Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion. Variables were averaged over respective 

















Table 5: Education and Domestic Terrorism [Subsample of Less Developed Countries] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary Education t-1  0.068      0.069 
 (2.88)
***      (2.86)
*** 
Secondary Education t-1   0.039     0.047 
   (1.09)     (1.31) 
Prim. + Sec. Education t-1    0.065     
     (3.37)
***      
University Enrollment t-1     -0.095   -0.020 
     (0.72)   (0.13) 
Literacy Rate t-1      0.011   
      (1.81)
*  








Military Spending p.c. t-1  0.167 0.108 0.103 0.188 0.067 0.130 
 (1.64)
*  (1.05) (1.00) (1.59) (0.60) (1.01) 
































Trade Openness t-1  -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (1.46)  (1.50)  (1.70)
* (1.30)  (1.47)  (1.57) 








Log Pseudolikelihood  -3672.92 -3686.66 -3670.66 -3707.86 -3700.90  -3670.22
N*T  1700 1700 1700 1710 1703 1700 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents. Robust absolute z-
values clustered on countries reported in parentheses. Constant not reported. All models 
include time and regional dummies (not reported). (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 42 
 
Table 6: Education and Domestic Terrorism [Subsample of Developed Countries] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary Education t-1  0.061      0.073 
  (0.89)      (1.11) 
Secondary Education t-1   -0.107     -0.091 
   (1.17)     (0.94) 
Prim. + Sec. Education t-1    -0.003     
    (0.05)     
University Enrollment t-1     -0.132   -0.183 
       (2.37)
**   (3.02)
*** 
Literacy Rate t-1      0.041   
      (1.13)   
















































Trade Openness t-1  -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.73)  (1.03)  (0.88)  (0.74) (0.99) (0.57) 
External Conflict t-1  2.526 2.333 2.789 3.178 3.250 2.590 
 (2.35)






Log Pseudolikelihood  -1734.53 -1733.23  -1736.75 -1731.52 -1721.00  -1724.02
N*T  992 992 992 992 983 992 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents. Robust absolute z-
values clustered on countries reported in parentheses. Constant not reported. All models 
include time and regional dummies (not reported). (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 43 
 
Appendix A. List of Countries 
Albania Egypt  Lebanon  Saudi  Arabia
† 
Algeria El  Salvador Liberia  Senegal 
Angola Estonia
† Libya  Sierra  Leone 









† Madagascar  Slovenia
† 
Austria
† Gabon  Malawi  Somalia 
Azerbaijan Gambia  Malaysia  South  Africa 
Bahamas
† Germany
† Mali  Spain
† 
Bahrain
† Ghana  Malta
† Sri  Lanka 
Bangladesh Greece
† Mexico Sudan 
Belarus Guatemala  Moldova  Sweden
† 
Belgium
† Guinea  Mongolia Switzerland
† 
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau  Morocco  Syria 
Botswana
† Guyana  Mozambique  Tanzania 




Burkina Faso  Hungary
† New  Zealand
†  Trinidad & Tobago 
Cameroon Iceland
† Nicaragua  Tunisia 
Canada
† India  Niger  Turkey 
Chile
† Indonesia  Nigeria  Uganda 
China Iran  Norway
† Ukraine 
Colombia Iraq  Oman
†  United Arab Emirates
† 
Congo (Republic)  Ireland
† Pakistan  United  Kingdom
† 
Congo (Zaire)  Israel




†  Papua New Guinea  Uruguay
† 
Cote d’Ivoire  Jamaica  Paraguay  Venezuela 
Croatia
† Japan
† Peru  Vietnam 
Cuba Jordan  Philippines  Yemen 
Cyprus
† Kazakhstan  Poland
† Zambia 
Czech Republic
† Kenya  Portugal
† Zimbabwe 
Denmark
† Korea  (South)
† Qatar
†  
Dominican Republic  Kuwait
† Romania   
Ecuador Latvia
† Russia   
Notes: (†) indicates that the country is included in the subsample of developed countries. The 
others are included in the subsample of less developed countries. See text for a further 
discussion. 44 
 
Appendix B. Control and Cluster Analysis Variables 
Population Size – Source: Penn World Table (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu). Definition: Size of 
population. Unit: In thousands, logged. 
Per Capita Military Spending – Source: National Material Capabilities Dataset 
(http://www.correlatesofwar.org/). Definition: Per capita military spending. Unit: Ratio, 
logged plus unity. 
General Strikes – Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
(http://www.databanksinternational.com). Definition: Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial 
or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority. Unit: Number. 
State Failure – Source: State Failure Task Force 
(http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfpset.htm). Definition: Additive index of intensity of 
ethnic and revolutionary wars, genocides/politicides and adverse regime changes. Unit: Index. 
Religious Tensions – Source: International Country Risk Guide 
(http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx). Definition: Assessment of the degree of tension 
within a country attributable to religious divisions. Unit: Score, rescaled to values in [0,1], 
with higher values indicating stronger tensions. 
Democracy – Source: PolityIV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
Definition: Combined polity score of institutionalized democracy score minus 
institutionalized autocracy score with converted instances of ‘standardized authority scores’ to 
conventional polity scores. Unit: Score, rescaled to values in [0,10], with higher values 
indicating higher levels of democracy. 
Trade Openness – Source: Penn World. Definition: Exports plus imports to real GDP per 
capita, i.e., total trade as percentage of GDP. Unit: Ratio. 
External Conflict – Source: International Country Risk Guide. Definition: An assessment of 
the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external 
pressure (diplomatic pressures, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure 
(cross-border conflicts to all-out war). Unit: Score, rescaled to values in [0,1], with higher 
values indicating higher risk of external conflict. 
Law and Order – Source: International Country Risk Guide. Definition: An assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system and of the popular observance of the law. Unit: 
Score, rescaled to values in [0,1], with higher values meaning a stronger rule of law. 45 
 
Corruption – Source: International Country Risk Guide. Definition: Measures actual or 
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-
favors’, secret party funding, and close ties between politics and business. Unit: Score, 
rescaled to values in [0,1], with higher values indicating more corruption. 
Government Size – Source: Penn World Table. Definition: Share of government consumption 
to real GDP. Unit: Ratio. 
Physical Integrity Index – Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project 
(http://ciri.binghamton.edu/). Definition: Additive index summarizing government respect for 
disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture. Unit: Ratio, with 
higher values indicating a better human rights situation. 
Population Density – Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Definition: 
Population per area. Unit: Ratio. 
Population Growth – Source: Penn World Table. Definition: Growth rate of population. Unit: 
Growth rate. 
Urbanization – Source: World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators). Definition: Share of population living in urban areas. 
Unit: Ratio. 
Per Capita Income – Source: Penn World Table. Definition: Real GDP per capita in constant 
prices (Laspeyres). Unit: Income in constant 2005 International US Dollars. 
Economic Growth – Source: Penn World Table. Definition: Growth rate of real GDP per 
capita in constant prices. Unit: Growth rate. 
Economic Rights – Source: International Country Risk Guide. Definition: An assessment of 
factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and 
financial risk components. Risk rating assigned as the sum of three subcomponents (contract 
viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, payment delays). Unit: Score, rescaled to values in 
[0,1], with higher values indicating better property rights protection. 
Inflation – Source: World Development Indicators. Definition: Inflation measured by the 
annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, showing the rate of price change in the 
economy as a whole. Unit: Growth rate. 
Female Labor Participation – Source: World Development Indicators. Definition: Shows the 
extent to which women are active in the labor force. Unit: Percentage of the total labor force. 46 
 
Supplementary Tables (FOR REFEREES’ USE ONLY) 
 
Table S1: Education and Total Terrorist Activity 
Model Education 
Variable(s) 















































































Notes: Dependent variable is the total (i.e., domestic and transnational) number of terrorist 
incidents. Table reports only coefficient for respective education proxy from a pooled NB 
regression of total terrorism on lagged values of the controls and on the respective education 
variable. Other model specifications (inclusion of regional and time dummies, control 
variables) as in Table 3. Robust absolute z-values clustered on countries reported in 









Table S2: Results from Alternative Estimation Techniques 
Model Education 
Variable(s) 






























































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents. Table reports only 
coefficient for respective education proxy from a pooled zero-inflated NB regression (Panel 
A) and a panel generalized estimation equation model (Panel B). Inflation variable in Panel A 
is democracy. In Panel B it is controlled for an AR(1) term. Other model specifications 
(inclusion of regional and time dummies, control variables) as in Table 3. Robust absolute z-
values clustered on countries reported in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 48 
 
Table S3: Long-Run Effect of Education on Domestic Terrorism 
Model Education 
Variable(s) 













































































Notes: Table reports only coefficient for respective education proxy from a pooled NB 
regression of six-year averages of terrorism on contemporaneous values of the controls and on 
lagged values (i.e., average values of education in the previous six-year period) of the 
respective education variable. Other model specifications (dependent variable, inclusion of 
regional and time dummies, control variables) as in Table 3. Robust absolute z-values 












Table S4: Changes in Education and Domestic Terrorism 
Model Education 
Variable(s) 
















































































Notes: Table reports only coefficient for respective education proxy from a pooled NB 
regression of domestic terrorism on lagged values of the controls and on changes in the 
respective education variable. Change (Δ) is defined as the difference between two periods. 
Other model specifications (inclusion of regional and time dummies, control variables) as in 
Table 3. Robust absolute z-values clustered on countries reported in parentheses. (*), (**) and 
(***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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